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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the determinants of the level of earnings management in a wide sample of 
listed firms from the hotel industry in 15 countries. The empirical study relies on the 
discretionary accruals, as an indication of earnings management, and examines the firm and 
country characteristics that are potentially associated with those discretionary accruals. The 
results suggest that firm characteristics, including the leverage ratio, cash flow from operations, 
investment opportunities and the frequency of losses, are the major determinant of earnings 
management in the hotel industry around the world. Our results also show that firms with five 
star hotels have different incentives to manipulate earnings, when compared to firms holding 
lower quality hotels. The hotels’ star rating also seems to play a different role in explaining the 
level of earnings management in common-law countries, when compared to code-law countries. 
This paper contributes to the accounting literature by examining the determinants of earnings 
management of a large panel of firms from the hotel industry and by focusing on the 
characteristics of the firm and its institutional environment. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Earnings management has attracted much attention 
from policymakers and regulators in the last years 
following several so known financial scandals. A 
substantial body of research in accounting is 
dedicated to understanding the causes and 
consequences of earnings management (Dechow, 
Hutton, Kim, & Sloan, 2012). Questions as why 
managers manipulate earnings, how they do so and 
for what purpose, have been widely studied in the 
empirical literature (Bharath, Sunder, & Sunder, 
2008; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004; Healy & Wahlen, 
1999; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003).  
Although earnings management is a major 
research topic in the accounting field, this stream of 
research has directed only limited attention to 
accounting behaviour in the hotel industry (Jang & 
Park, 2011; Park & Jang, 2014). Prior research has 
focused mainly on the hotels’ efficiency (Oliveira, 
Pedro, & Marques, 2013) and on their financial 
performance (Chen et al., 2012; Xiao et al., 2012; Ray 
& Phillips, 2005).  
Over the last decades, tourism has been 
growing and became a key industry in the world 
economy. The international tourism revenue has 
increased from about 2 billion dollars in 1950 to 
1.197 billion dollars in 2013 (UNWTO Word Tourism 
Barometer, 2015). Nowadays, this industry 
represents more than one third of the world exports 
of services and it is an important driver of economic 
growth and prosperity.  
The hotel industry shows higher sales volatility, 
higher incidence of losses and lower earnings quality 
(Parte-Esteban & Garcia, 2014). However, not much is 
known about the incentives to management earnings 
in this industry (Park & Jang, 2014). We aim to fill 
this gap in the literature, by analysing the firm and 
country characteristics that play an important role 
in explaining the level of earnings management in 
the hotel industry. 
The empirical analysis relies on a sample of 
listed firms from the tourism industry in 15 
countries. We focus on the level of discretionary 
accruals, namely the modified Jones model 
suggested by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), as a 
dimension of earnings management that is 
particularly responsive to firms’ financial reporting 
incentives.  
The empirical findings show that firm 
characteristics are the major determinant of 
earnings management in the tourism industry. More 
specifically, our results demonstrate that firms with 
more investment opportunities, with more financial 
leverage, with greater cash flow from operations and 
with more incidences of losses are associated to a 
higher level of earnings management. These results 
add to the previous literature indicating that firm 
characteristics are important incentives in 
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explaining earnings management variations across 
firms from different countries (Parte-Esteban & 
Garcia, 2014; Chen, Tang, Jiang, & Li, 2010; Gaio, 
2010; Sánches-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007).  
Regarding the country level variables, we found 
that firms located in more developed countries and 
in common-law countries are associated with a lower 
level of earnings management, which is consistent 
with previous research on the determinants of 
earnings management worldwide (e.g. Ball, Robin, & 
Wu, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Gaio, 2010). 
Our results also show that incentives to 
manage earnings by firms with five star hotels are 
quite different, when compared to firms holding 
lower quality hotels. The hotels’ star rating also 
seems to play a different role in explaining the level 
of earnings management in common-law countries, 
when compared to code-law countries. 
This study adds to the knowledge about the 
hotel industry by examining the firm-level and 
country-level characteristics that determine the level 
of earnings management. It has the novelty of 
investigating the incentives for managing earnings in 
top hotels worldwide, particularly the influence of 
star rating. This paper helps the understanding of 
earnings management choices in hotels around the 
world. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
determinants of earnings management and develops 
the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research 
design. Section 4 analyses the results and section 5 
presents the concluding remarks. 
 
2.  PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Based on previous literature, we present a set of 
hypotheses about the relationship between firm and 
country characteristics and the level of earnings 
management. 
 
2.1. Firm-level determinants of earnings 
management  
 
Type of hotels (based on the star rating). The 
star rating of hotels aims to harmonize international 
standards in order to differentiate and improve 
hotel facilities and services. Having a greater number 
of stars suggests more luxury, and better services, 
food and beverages, entertainment, panoramic views 
and a variety of rooms of different sizes. Additional 
requirements, such as spa centres and fitness 
facilities, as well as location, are also commonly 
considered in the definition of a good standard. 
Holding five star hotels is associated with foreign 
assets and investors who bring better management 
techniques and attracted more attention from 
customers and analysts. Empirical studies suggest 
that greater number of stars is associated to greater 
efficiency and greater profitability. Ray and Phillips 
(2005) show that a greater number of stars is 
associated with better financial performance in 
hotels. Assaf and Agbola (2011) suggest a positive 
relationship between the number of stars and 
efficiency of hotels. Given that a greater number of 
stars attract more attention from a wide range of 
stakeholders, we expect that greater number of stars 
is associated to a lower level of earnings 
management.  
We, thus, hypothesize that there is a negative 
association between firms having five star hotels 
and the level of earnings management.  
Size. Firm size is usually believed to influence 
the relationship between firms’ ownership and 
earnings management (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; 
Verrecchia, 1983; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Large 
firms take into account their concern about 
reputation and visibility. Verrecchia (1983) supports 
the idea that managers of larger firms are likely to 
sense that the cost of supplying non-proprietary 
information to the public is minimal, when 
compared with managers of smaller firms. In fact, 
the cost of generating, assembling and 
disseminating detailed information is believed to be 
higher for smaller firms than for larger ones (Singhvi 
& Desai, 1971), because the latter generally already 
collects this information for internal purposes. 
Because large firms attract more attention from 
financial analysts and the press, it is more difficult 
for them to conceal their earnings management 
behaviour (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Hence, the cost of 
engaging in earnings management will be higher for 
large firms.  
We, thus, expect to find a negative association 
between firms’ size and the level of earnings 
management. 
Leverage. The relationship between earnings 
management and leverage is often ambiguous (Healy 
& Palepu, 2001). Based on the agency theory, 
financial leverage can act as a self-disciplining 
internal governance mechanism to mitigate the costs 
of debt among owners, managers and creditors 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Francis et al. (2004) state 
that firms more dependent on external financing 
tend to achieve a higher quality of accounting 
figures, because they believe this will lead to a lower 
cost of external financing. However, the firm’s debt 
is usually regulated through formal written 
contracts, which, in many cases, set some terms for 
the firm, i.e. covenants. The linking of these clauses 
is connected to the financial information, since they 
are based on financial ratios. Therefore, managers 
can be encouraged to manage the earnings to avoid 
the penalties considered in the covenants. Authors 
like Sweeney (1994), Dichev and Skinner (2002) and 
Bharath et al. (2008) find that there is a higher level 
of earnings management when firms have higher 
levels of debt.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that there is a 
positive association between firms’ leverage and the 
level of earnings management.  
Investment opportunities. The relationship 
between investment opportunities and earnings 
management seems to be not consensual. On the 
one hand, firms with high growth potentials are 
generally dependent upon raising equity or debt 
capital to fund profitable investment projects. A 
greater need for external financing creates 
incentives to improve earnings quality so as to 
benefit from the lower cost of capital (Bhattacharya, 
Hazem, & Welker, 2003; Francis et al., 2004). On the 
other hand, some prior studies find that firms with 
high growth opportunities present more important 
investment opportunities, which encourages 
managers to influence the probability of obtaining 
the future financing needs through the exercise of 
accounting discretion. In this regard, Sánches-
Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) suggest that firms 
with a high market to book ratio may have higher 
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discretionary accruals than firms with a low market 
to book ratio. Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that the 
market severely penalises growth firms in the case 
of negative earnings surprises. Therefore, growth 
firms have relatively strong incentives to meet 
earnings benchmarks, perhaps to avoid increases in 
the cost of capital or to maintain access to it. 
We, thus, hypothesize that there is a positive 
association between change in firms’ growth rate 
and the level of earnings management.  
Cash flow from operations. According to 
Roychowdhury (2006), managers also use cash flow 
from operations to manipulate real earnings 
activities during the year to meet certain earnings 
targets. García and Steban (2014) in line with 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005), states 
that greater cash flow from operations is associated 
with more uncertainty in the operation environment, 
which means there is a higher probability of 
manager judgment and error estimation and thus, 
poorer accruals quality.  
We, thus, expect to find a positive association 
between firms’ cash flow from operations and the 
level of earnings management. 
Frequency of negative earnings. Previous 
literature states that negative earnings may induce 
managers to use more accruals to mitigate the 
impact of losses, which leads to greater incentives of 
accounting manipulations. Park and Shin (2004) 
show that firms facing financial constraints or 
distress have an incentive to adjust earnings in 
order to avoid the disclosure of a financial problem 
leading to a potential loss. Roychowdhury (2006) 
find evidence that managers manipulate real 
activities to avoid reporting annual losses. Gaio 
(2010) also find that more incidence of losses 
negatively affect accounting quality.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that there is a 
positive association between firms’ frequency of 
negative earnings and the level of earnings 
management. 
 
2.2. Country-level determinants of earnings 
management  
 
Economic development. Existing literature 
indicates that economic development affects 
financial reporting quality (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et 
al., 2003). Ball et al. (2000) find that poorer 
economic development is too costly to support 
credible accounting information. Consequently, this 
could aff ect managerial incentives to produce high-
quality financial information, leading to firms 
located in poorer economically developed countries 
having stronger incentives for earnings 
management. According to the Leuz et al. (2003), 
earnings management is more pervasive in countries 
where the economic development is poor, because 
managers and insiders in these countries enjoy 
private control benefits and hence have stronger 
incentives to obfuscate firm performance. In the 
same vein, Gaio (2010) determines that firms in less 
developed countries have lower earnings quality 
rankings. 
Hence, we expect to find a negative association 
between economic development and the level of 
earnings management. 
Origin of country. La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) classify the countries 
based on the origin of their commercial laws, which 
is historically predetermined. In general, commercial 
laws derive from common-law tradition, which is 
English in origin, and civil-law tradition, which draws 
from Roman law. Laws vary greatly across countries, 
partly due to differences in legal origin. According 
La Porta et al. (1998) legal systems have also been 
influencing the demand for accounting information 
in countries over the years. Several empirical studies 
provide empirical evidence that a common-law 
country’s legal system and consequently higher 
degree of enforcement in a country is associated 
with lower earnings management (Ball et al., 2000; 
Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003).  
Therefore, we expect to find a negative 
association between firms located in common-law 
countries and the level of earnings management. 
 
3.  RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
3.1. The Sample 
 
The empirical study relies on the worldwide set of 
listed firms from the hotel industry with accounting 
information available in the Thomson Worlscope 
Database. Given the focus of the analysis, the quality 
of accounting information, and in order to guarantee 
the homogeneity of the data, we considered only 
those countries where firms are required to apply 
the International Financial Reporting Standards 
when preparing such accounting information.  
Given the need to use data from many years to 
apply the earnings management model, we based 
our analysis on firms with accounting information 
available at least for seven consecutive years. To 
ensure that the regression results are not influenced 
by unusual or extreme observations, we first 
winsorize the extreme values of all variables (1%); 
then we remove the observations for which the 
absolute value of the studentized residual is higher 
than two. The final sample is an unbalanced panel 
comprising 568 firm-year observations over the 
period 2007-2013. 
Table 1 presents the sample composition by 
country. Croatia is the most dominant country (24%), 
followed by Bulgaria (11%), and Cyprus (10%). The 
smallest representations are for the Bahrain, Peru, 
Spain, Turkey and United States. Due to concerns 
regarding that the empirical findings would be 
dependent on the effect of countries with a large 
number of firms, we re-estimate the empirical model 
eliminating firms from Croatia. The main results are 
not affected by this sample variation.  
 
Table 1. Sample composition by country 
 
Country N. observations % 
Australia 
Bahrain 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
France 
Greece 
New Zealand 
Oman 
Peru 
Philippines 
South Africa 
Spain 
Turkey 
United States 
47 
14 
65 
135 
54 
42 
33 
21 
45 
11 
28 
37 
14 
12 
10 
8 
2 
12 
22 
9 
8 
6 
4 
8 
2 
6 
6 
3 
2 
2 
Total 568 100 
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3.2. Variables 
 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable 
used in this study is the level of earnings 
management, measured by the commonly used 
magnitude of the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (ABS_DA
i,t
). We compute this measure by 
using the modified Jones model, with current-year 
ROA (Return on Assets), according to Kothari et al. 
(2005). We started by computing the total accrual 
(TA
i,t
) of firm i, in year t, as indicated in the equation:  
 
 
(1) 
 
where, ∆CA
i,t  
is the change of current assets for 
firm i between year t-1 and year t; ∆Cash
 i,t
 is the 
change in cash for firm i between year t-1 and year t; 
∆CL
 i,t 
is the change of current liabilities for firm i 
between year t-1 and year t; ∆STDEBT 
 i,t
 is the 
change in debt in current liabilities for firm i 
between year t-1 and year t; DEPN
 i,t 
is the 
depreciation and amortization expense for firm i, 
year t.  All the variables are scaled by the average 
total assets for firm i, year t-1 (A
i,t-1
) to overcome 
heteroskedasticity.  
We regress total accruals (TA
i,t
) on the change in 
revenues for firm i between year t-1 and year t 
(∆REV
 i,t
), the level of gross property, plant and 
equipment for firm i in year t (PPE 
i,t 
) and return of 
assets for firm i in year t (ROA
i,t 
), scaled by lagged 
total assets (A
i,t-1
), as indicated in the equation:  
 
  
(2) 
 
The parameters  are generated into 
equation (2). The regression residuals (the equation’s 
prediction error) are the discretionary accruals. 
Mathematically, abnormal accruals for firm i in year 
t, (AA
i,t
) are calculated as the difference between the 
actual total accruals (TA
i,t
) and the estimated normal 
accruals (NA
i,t
): 
 
 (3) 
 
where, AA
i,t
 is the abnormal accruals in year t; 
other variables are previously defined. 
We use the absolute value of abnormal 
accruals, ABS_DA, as the dependent variable to 
proxy for earnings management in the regression 
model: 
 
ABS_DA= |AA
i,t
| 
 
(4) 
 
A higher magnitude of absolute discretionary 
accruals corresponds to a greater level of earnings 
management, or lower accounting quality, and vice 
versa. Our measure of earnings management, the 
modified Jones model with ROA, has some 
limitations (Dechow, Ge & Sharand, 2010). In order 
to further validate our results, we also calculated 
other earnings management variables: the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals estimated by Jones 
(1991) model, the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals estimated by modified Jones model 
suggested by Dechow, Sloa and Sweeney (1995) and 
modified Jones model with book-to market (BM) and 
cash flow from operation (CFO) by Larcker and 
Richardson (2004). However, the main results of our 
study remain unchanged.  
Independent firm-level variables. A set of 
independent firm-level variables is used to test the 
hypotheses related to the association between firms’ 
characteristics and the level of earnings 
management. Based on prior literature, we 
hypothesize that there is a negative association 
between the firms’ size and the level of earnings 
management, and a positive association between the 
firms’ leverage, investment opportunities, cash flow 
from operations and frequency of negative earnings 
and the level of earnings management.  
We thus use the following set of firm-level 
variables: SIZE, LEVERAGE, GROWTH, CFO and 
NEGNIBE. The variable SIZE is measured by the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets, and 
LEVERAGE is the firm’s total debt divided by the 
market capitalisation. The variable GROWTH is the 
annual percentage change in sales. The CFO is the 
cash flow from operations scaled by total assets and 
NEGNIBE is the frequency of negative earnings 
measured as the number of the firm-year 
observations with negative net income before 
extraordinary items (NIBE) divided by the total 
number of the firm-year observations. 
We also use an industry specific firm-level 
variable that distinguishes firms based on the hotels 
features. Previous empirical literature suggests that 
hotel classification (based on the star rating) play an 
important role in explaining the performance and 
efficiency of hotels (Ray and Phillips, 2005; Assaf 
and Agbola, 2011). We use a similar binary variable, 
CLASS, that assumes 1 if the firm hold five-star 
hotels and 0 otherwise.   
Independent country-level variables. A set of 
independent country-level variables is used to test 
the hypotheses related to the association between 
country characteristics and the level of earnings 
management. Based on prior literature, we 
hypothesize that there is a negative association 
between the level of economic development and the 
legal origin of countries and the level of earnings 
management.  We thus use the following country-
level variables: DEVELOPMENT and ORIGIN. 
DEVELOPMENT is the natural logarithm of gross 
domestic product per capita for each country. 
ORIGIN is a binary variable that assumes 1 if the 
firm is domiciled in a common-law country and 0 
otherwise.  
, , , , , ,( ) ( )i t i t i t i t i t i tTA CA Cash CL STDEBT DEPN      
 , ,, , ,
1 2 3 4 ,
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
1 i t i ti t i t i t
i t
i t i t i t i t i t
REV ARTA PPE ROA
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    
    
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3.3. Research model 
 
In order to analyse the firm-level and country-level 
characteristics   that   play   an    important   role   in  
 
explaining the level of earnings management in the 
hotel industry, we estimate the following model: 
 
 
ABS_DA
i,t
=β
0
+β
1
CLASS
i,t
+β
2
SIZE
i,t
+β
3
LEVERAGE
i,t
+β
4
GROWTH
i,t
+β
5
CFO
i,t
+
6
NEGNIBE
i,t
+β
7
DEVELOPME
NT
i,t
+ β
8
ORIGIN
i,t
+ β
9
YEAR
i,t
+ β
10
COUNTRY
i,t
+ε
i,t
 
 
(6) 
 
where, ABS_DA
i,t
 is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals  (MJM with ROA) estimated by 
Kothari et al. (2005). The independent variables are 
computed as shown in the previous section. The 
regression is estimated with year and country fixed 
effects.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in this study.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of alternative dependent variables (ABS_DA) 
 Mean Std Dev 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
Jones model (JM) 
Modified Jones model (MJM) 
Modified Jones model with BM and 
CFO (MJM with BM and CFO) 
Modified Jones model with ROA 
(MJM with ROA) 
0.036 
0.037 
 
0.036 
 
0.037 
0.036 
0.036 
 
0.035 
 
0.034 
0.004 
0.005 
 
0.005 
 
0.005 
0.011 
0.011 
 
0.012 
 
0.012 
0.026 
0.026 
 
0.026 
 
0.027 
0.049 
0.049 
 
0.047 
 
0.050 
0.086 
0.87 
 
0.081 
 
0.082 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
 Mean Std Dev 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
CLASS 
SIZE 
LEVERAGE 
GROWTH 
CFO 
NEGNIBE 
DEVELOP 
ORIGIN 
0.680 
11.872 
54.177 
0.345 
0.054 
0.380 
3.181 
0.300 
0.467 
1.697 
85.936 
4.690 
0.073 
0.345 
0.502 
0.458 
- 
10.000 
0.000 
-0.255 
-0.012 
0.000 
2.526 
- 
- 
10.792 
3.978 
-0.055 
0.011 
0.000 
2.943 
- 
- 
11.660 
26.220 
0.039 
0.037 
0.330 
3.039 
- 
- 
12.743 
69.135 
0.154 
0.087 
0.670 
3.608 
- 
- 
14.398 
124.333 
0.518 
0.151 
0.830 
3.780 
- 
Jones model (JM) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by Jones (1991); Modified Jones model (MJM) is 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by Dechow et al. (1995); Modified Jones model with BM and CFO (MJM with 
BM and CFO) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by Larcker and Richardson (2004); Modified Jones model 
with ROA (MJM with ROA) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by Kothary et al. (2005). CLASS is a binary 
variable that assumes 1 if the firm hold five-star hotels and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in dollars. 
LEVERAGE is the firm total debt divided by its total market capitalisation. GROWTH is the annual percentage change in sales. CFO 
is the cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. NEGNIBE is the frequency of negative earnings measured as the number of 
firm-year observations with negative NIBE divided by the total number of firm-year observations. DEVELOPMENT is the natural 
logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. ORIGIN is a binary that assumes 1 if the firm is domiciled in a common-law 
country and 0 otherwise. The number of observations is 568.  
 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the 
alternative dependent variables used in the empirical 
analysis. The mean (median) value of the main 
dependent variable, ABS_DA (Modified Jones Model 
with ROA), is 0.037 (0.027), which is consistent with 
prior literature on earnings management (e.g. 
Esteban and Devesa, 2011).  
Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the 
firm-level and country-level variables. Regarding the 
firm-level variables, we found that SIZE has a mean 
(median) value of 11.87 (11.66), LEVERAGE has a 
mean (median) value of 54.18 (26.22), GROWTH has 
a mean (median) value of 0.345 (0.039), CFO has a 
mean (median) value of 0.054 (0.037) and NEGNIBE 
has a mean (median) value of 0.38 (0.33). Sánches-
Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) and Gaio (2010) 
report similar results for most of these variables. We 
also found that 68% of the firms included in our 
sample hold five star hotels. Regarding the country-
level independent variables, we found that DEVELOP 
has a mean (median) value of 3.181 (3.039) and 30% 
of the firms are domiciled in a common-law country.  
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlations among 
all the variables included in our study. 
 
Table 3. Pearson Correlations  
 
 ABS_DA CLASS SIZE LEVERAGE GROWTH CFO NEGNIBE DEVELOP ORIGIN VIF 
ABS_DA 
CLASS 
SIZE 
LEVERAGE 
GROWTH 
CFO 
NEGNIBE 
DEVELOP 
ORIGIN 
1.000 
0.034 
-0.069 
0.064 
0.099 
0.090 
0.060 
-0.104 
-0.120 
 
1.000 
0.090 
0.132 
-0.028 
-0.041 
0.080 
0.214 
0.117 
 
 
1.000 
0.139 
0.017 
-0.011 
-0.116 
0.246 
0.142 
 
 
 
1.000 
0.063 
-0.029 
0.021 
0.038 
0.160 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
0.104 
-0.049 
0.097 
0.062 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
-0.596 
0.100 
0.121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
-0.165 
-0.146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
0.243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.000 
 
1.094 
1.114 
1.079 
1.029 
1.587 
1,632 
1,208 
1,121 
ABS_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by Kothary et al. (2005). CLASS is a binary variable that 
assumes 1 if the firm hold five-star hotels and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in dollars. LEVERAGE is 
the firm total debt divided by its total market capitalisation. GROWTH is the annual percentage change in sales. CFO is the cash 
flow from operations scaled by total assets. NEGNIBE is the frequency of negative earnings measured as the number of firm-year 
observations with negative NIBE divided by the total number of firm-year observations. DEVELOPMENT is the natural logarithm of 
gross domestic product per capita. ORIGIN is a binary that assumes 1 if the firm is domiciled in a common-law country and 0 
otherwise. The number of observations is 568. Boldface denotes significance at the 1% and 5% level. 
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These results show that the dependent variable, 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABS_DA), is 
negatively correlated with the variables DEVELOP 
and ORIGIN, which is consistent with prior research 
on earnings management (e.g. Gaio, 2010; Ball et al. 
2000). It seems that firms from more developed 
countries and firms from common-law origin 
countries are less likely to exercise accounting 
discretion in order to manipulate earnings.  
We also found that ABS_DA is positively related 
to GROWTH and CFO, which means that firms with 
greater cash flow from operations and firms with 
more investment opportunities are more likely to 
stimulate managers’ opportunities to manipulate 
earnings. These findings are also consistent with 
prior literature on earnings management (e.g. 
Sánches-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007; Ali, Chen & 
Radhakrishman, 2007).  
Regarding the variable CLASS, we found that 
firms holding five star hotels are larger, more 
leveraged and they predominate in more developed 
countries and in common-law countries. 
The results presented in Table 3 show there are 
no pairwise correlation coefficients in excess of 0.80, 
indicating that the threat of multicollinearity is 
limited. The highest coefficient represents the value 
– 0.596 between NEGNIBE and CFO. However, we also 
conduct a formal test to ensure that 
multicollinearity is not present in our sample. In 
particular, we calculate the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) for each independent continuous variable 
included in the estimated model. Kennedy (1992) 
suggests that a VIF greater than ten is indicative of 
problematic multicollinearity. The highest VIF value 
presented in Table 3 is 1.632, which is well below 10. 
Overall, the correlation values are low, which 
suggests that our independent variables capture 
different aspects of business and countries 
environment characteristics.  
 
4.2. Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression 
analysis. The dependent variable in all the models is 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(ABS_DA) estimated by Kothari et al. (2005). The 
independent variables are estimated in three models. 
Model 1 includes only the firm-level variables, model 
2 includes only country-level variables and model 3 
brings together firm-level and country-level 
variables.  
 
Table 4. Regression results (all sample) 
 
 Model 1 
(t-stat) 
Model 2 
(t-stat) 
Model 3 
(t-stat) 
Intercept 
 
CLASS 
 
SIZE 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
GROWTH 
 
CFO 
 
NEGNIBE 
 
DEVELOP 
 
ORIGIN 
0.010 
(0.687) 
0.003 
(-0.856) 
0.001 
(1.212) 
0.000 
(2.046) 
0.004 
(2.876) 
0.055 
(1.798) 
0.016 
(2.968) 
 
0.046 
(4.703) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.004 
(-1.902) 
-0.009 
(-2.106) 
0.053 
(3.912) 
0.004 
(1.380) 
-0.001 
(-0.722) 
0.000 
(1.746) 
0.001 
(2.387) 
0.083 
(3.386) 
0.013 
(2.428) 
-0,006 
(1.816) 
-0.009 
(-2.859) 
Year dummies 
Country dummies 
Adjusted R-square 
Yes 
Yes 
0.08 
Yes 
No 
0.03 
Yes 
No 
0.09 
CLASS is a binary variable that assumes 1 if the firm hold five-star hotels and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets in dollars. LEVERAGE is the firm total debt divided by its total market capitalisation. GROWTH is the annual percentage 
change in sales. CFO is the cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. NEGNIBE is the frequency of negative earnings 
measured as the number of firm-year observations with negative NIBE divided by the total number of firm-year observations. 
DEVELOPMENT is the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. ORIGIN is a binary that assumes 1 if the firm is 
domiciled in a common-law country and 0 otherwise. The number of observations is 568. Boldface denotes significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level. 
 
The firm-level variables have higher 
explanatory power of earnings management 
(adjusted R2 = 8%), when compared to the country-
level variables (adjusted R2 = 3%). It seems that firm 
characteristics are the major determinant of 
earnings management in the hotel industry 
worldwide. These results are consistent with those 
of Gaio (2010), who examine the role of firm and 
country characteristics in explaining earnings quality 
in a sample of firms from different industries. 
Regarding the firm-level variables, our findings 
demonstrate that the hotels star rating (CLASS) and 
the firms size (SIZE) are not statistically related to 
the level of earnings management. The other firm-
level variables coefficients are statistically 
significant although not always at 1% level. 
Consistent with our hypotheses, the variables 
investment opportunities (GROWTH), firms leverage 
(LEVERAGE), cash flow from operations (CFO) and 
frequency of negative earnings (NEGNIBE) are 
positively related to the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals.  
It seems that firms with more investment 
opportunities and the firms with more financial 
leverage, greater cash flow from operations and 
more incidence of losses, are associated with a 
higher level of earnings management. These findings 
are consistent with previous studies indicating that 
greater cash flow from operations seems to create 
more uncertainty in the operation environment 
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(Francis et al., 2004). Consequently, there is a 
stronger probability of manager judgment and error 
estimation, which increases managers’ opportunities 
to exercise accounting discretion. Regarding the 
frequency of negative earnings, our results indicate 
that managers use more accruals to mitigate the 
impact of losses, which would affect the earnings 
management decisions (Park & Shin, 2004).  
Regarding the country level variables, we found 
that firms located in more developed countries 
(DEVELOP) and firms located in common-law 
countries (ORIGIN) are associated with a lower level 
of earnings management. It seems that managers 
and insiders in less developed countries and in code-
law countries, which usually have a lower level of 
enforcement, enjoy private control benefit and hence 
have stronger incentives to obfuscate the firms 
performance.  
In order to investigate whether different firms 
from the hotel industry (based on the star rating) 
have different incentives to engage in earnings 
management behaviour, we split the sample into two 
groups: firms holding five-star hotels and firms not 
holding five star hotels. Table 5 presents the results 
of this analysis. 
 
Table 5. Regression results (sub-samples) 
 
 
Five-star hotels 
 
n=386 
Other hotels 
 
n=182 
Common-law countries 
n=169 
Code-law countries 
n=399 
Intercept 
 
CLASS 
 
SIZE 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
GROWTH 
 
CFO 
 
NEGNIBE 
 
DEVELOP 
 
ORIGIN 
 
 
0.061 
(3.492) 
- 
- 
0.001 
(-0.756) 
0.000 
(1.419) 
0.001 
(1.644) 
0.100 
(3.323) 
0.012 
(1.838) 
-0.005 
(-1.181) 
-0.014 
(-3.373) 
0.005 
(1.547) 
- 
- 
0.000 
(-0.092) 
0.000 
(1.492) 
0.001 
(1.749) 
0.010 
(0.227) 
0.014 
(1.410) 
-0.004 
(-0.721) 
0.005 
(0.910) 
0.040 
(1.622) 
-0.011 
(-2.001) 
0.001 
(1.026) 
0.000 
(0.800) 
0.000 
(0.643) 
0.036 
(1.201) 
0.011 
(1.201) 
-0.006 
(-1.065) 
- 
- 
0.048 
(2.833) 
0.008 
(2.000) 
-0.001 
(-0.985) 
0.000 
(1.819) 
0.001 
(2.197) 
0.096 
(2.751) 
0.015 
(2.113) 
-0.004 
(-0.967) 
- 
- 
Year dummies 
Country dummies 
Adjusted R-square 
Yes 
Yes 
0.08 
Yes 
Yes 
0.07 
Yes 
Yes 
0.07 
Yes 
Yes 
0.05 
CLASS is a binary variable that assumes 1 if the firm hold five-star hotels and 0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets in dollars. LEVERAGE is the firm total debt divided by its total market capitalisation. GROWTH is the annual 
percentage change in sales. CFO is the cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. NEGNIBE is the frequency of negative 
earnings measured as the number of firm-year observations with negative NIBE divided by the total number of firm-year 
observations. DEVELOPMENT is the natural logarithm of gross domestic product per capita. ORIGIN is a binary that assumes 1 if 
the firm is domiciled in a common-law country and 0 otherwise. Boldface denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
In the group of firms holding five star hotels, 
cash flow from operation (CFO) and frequency of 
negative earnings (NEGNIBE) are positively 
associated to the level of earnings management, 
while firms from common-low countries (ORIGIN) 
are less likely to manipulate earnings.  
In the group of firms not holding five star 
hotels, only investment opportunities (GROWTH) are 
associated to the level of earnings management. It 
seems that firms providing a lower quality service, 
mainly in less developed countries and with higher 
growth potentials, are more likely to need external 
financing funds, which may create strong incentives 
for earnings management. 
We also investigate whether firms from 
differences type of countries (common-low versus 
code-law) have different incentives to manipulate 
earnings by splitting the sample into two groups: 
firms from common-law countries and firms from 
code-law countries.  Table 5 also presents the results 
of this analysis.  
In the group of firms from common-law 
countries, only the type of firm (firms holding versus 
not holding five star hotels) is significantly 
associated to the level of earnings management. 
According to the World Hotel Rating Agency, a 
greater number of stars suggests more luxury and 
better services, entertainment, panoramic views, a 
variety of rooms of different sizes and facilities. 
Hence, firms with five star hotels have more 
visibility and they attract great attention from the 
market, which could limit earnings management 
behaviour.  
In the group of firms from code-law countries, 
leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), investment opportunities 
(GROWTH), cash flow from operation (CFO) and 
frequency of negative earnings (NEGNIBE) are 
positively associated with the level of earnings 
management. However, we also found that firms 
with five star hotels seem to engage in a higher level 
of earnings management. A possible explanation for 
this opposite result, when compared to common-law 
countries, is that in code-law countries the effect of 
the lower level of enforcement predominates, when 
compared to the market attention and pressure for 
transparency. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines the firm-level and country-level 
determinants of earnings management in the hotel 
industry across 15 countries. We provide empirical 
evidence that firm characteristics, including the 
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leverage ratio, cash flow from operations, 
investment opportunities and the frequency of 
losses, are the major determinant of earnings 
management in the hotel industry around the world.  
Our results also show that firms with five star 
hotels have different incentives to manipulate 
earnings, when compared to firms holding lower 
quality hotels. The hotels’ star rating also seems to 
play a different role in explaining the level of 
earnings management in common-law countries, 
when compared to code-law countries.  
Our findings contribute to the accounting 
literature by examining the determinants of earnings 
management of a large panel of firms from the hotel 
industry and by focusing on the characteristics of 
the firm and its institutional environment and, 
specially, by providing new evidence on the role of 
the hotel quality and reputation in understanding of 
earnings management choices in hotels around the 
world.  
Our findings do not attempt to imply that firm 
characteristics substitute country characteristics in 
explaining earnings management. Although firm and 
country characteristics play different roles, they 
interact in determining earnings management. In 
future research, it would be interesting to analyse 
the economic effect of the differences in firm-level 
determinants of earnings management in the hotel 
industry around the world. 
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